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had to be taken and the number of detailed 
arrangements that had to be worked out by the 
Staff in order to accomplish the given task in 
the time available. This work was further 
complicated by the need to maintain the utmost 
secrecy in all phases of the preparation and 
dispatch of the expedition. 
For my part I breathed a sigh of relief when 
I was informed that the first ship had sailed at 
the time specified, without the news breaking in 
the press. At the same time I felt that we had 
accomplished one of the best bits of rapid 
preparation and organization that had ever been 
done by the Department of National Defence. We 
had organized and dispatched the force in 
slightly over two weeks. We had provided 
practically 100% of the equipment and reserve 
equipment as laid down by the War Office. We 
had provided 100% of the transport and reserve 
transport as laid down. This equipment and 
transport was the product of Canadian industry 
and its availability meant that the Hong Kong 
force was the best and most completely equipped 
force that had ever left the shores of Canada. In 
this connection I would call your attention to a 
cable M.O. 2B of 30th October from C.I.G.S to 
C.G.S. Canada, which reads as under-
We are very grateful to you for dispatching your 
contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice. 
We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization 
and of distance which have had to be overcome. 
The moral effect of their arrival in November 
will be much greater that it would have been 
two months later. 
May I, at this stage of my evidence, remind 
the Commission of the conditions existing at the 
time of the inception and dispatch of the Hong 
Kong force. We were at peace with Japan. War 
was possible but not imminent, according to our 
information from London. As evidence of this 
1. Introduction 
In an inquiry of this nature it is only natural that the alleged shortcomings of the inception, 
preparation and dispatch of the Hong Kong force 
will be apt to receive greater attention than the 
actual accomplishment of organizing, equipping 
and dispatching a force of this nature in slightly 
over two weeks. 
I suggest that the completion of the task of 
organizing and dispatching the Hong Kong 
expedition in the time available and according 
to War Office specifications in practically every 
detail, is in itself good evidence that the Army 
was so organized and staffed that it could meet 
a difficult situation rapidly and effectively. In the 
light of subsequent events certain parts of our 
preparations appear to be open to criticism. I 
would ask the Commission to view those 
criticisms not in the light of after events, but in 
the light of conditions existing at the time. 
On the 9th October we received the cable 
from the War Office in London that enabled us 
to begin our detailed preparations. Two days 
later we were asked to increase the force by the 
addition of a Brigade Headquarters and other 
details amounting to officers and other ranks. 
The force sailed form Vancouver on the 27th 
October. The troopship carried all personnel, a 
considerable quantity of stores, particularly 
asked for, and all the equipment (less transport) 
plus a substantial equipment reserve. The 
transport followed on another ship on 4th 
November. 
I am sure that the Commission, after going 
through the files and reading the outline records 
of the two meetings held under the chairmanship 
of Colonel (now Brigadier) Gibson, will 
appreciate the large number of decisions that 
Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, DSO, MC (centre) and CD. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply (left), inspecting one 
of the first Canadian-built Valentine tanks at the Angus Shops of the Montreal Locomotive Works, 27 May 1941. 
statement, I would refer you to the original cable 
form London dated the 19th September and the 
cable received form the War Office as the late as 
the 26th October. I would also refer you to the 
reaction of the press throughout Canada when 
the news broke that a Canadian force had landed 
in Hong Kong. The reaction was not only 
favourable, but enthusiastic from on side of 
Canada to the other. The only criticism I can 
remember seeing regarding the Hong Kong 
expedition at that time was that the Government 
did not make adequate use of the publicity value 
of the press release. I emphasize these facts 
because it is in the light of conditions as they 
existed prior to the 7th December that the 
various points included in the terms of reference 
of this inquiry must be considered and judged. 
The Canadian Army is on trial at this inquiry. 
We, in the Army, find ourselves in a strange 
position. As a nation we are at war and are going 
through the most critical period we have ever 
faced. The Army is one of the major instruments 
used in the prosecution of the war. Yet, at this 
critical period, when we should be devoting all 
our thoughts and energies to the vital task on 
hand, we are forced to turn our backs to one 
main task and defend ourselves and the good 
name of the Army, not against our enemies, but 
against a charge of alleged gross incompetence 
based on matters that could not possibly and 
did not influence that final outcome of the Battle 
of Hong Kong. 
It is a simple matter to be wise after the event 
had happened. It is a much more difficult matter 
to anticipate events before they happen. I confess 
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that I would be forced to plead guilty to the latter 
charge. I realized that was with Japan was 
possible, but I did not think Japan would take 
the plunge, if she took it at all, until the collapse 
either of Russia of Great Britain. Nor did I 
anticipate the disastrous events of 7th December 
and later. In these respects I was in good 
company. Because Mr. Churchill. By his own 
admission, was of the some opinions as were a 
great many others in Great Britain, in the United 
States and in Canada. 
2. Inception of Hong Kong 
Expedition 
You have been told by Brigadier Gibson of events that took place subsequent to receipt 
of the telegram, No. 162, dated 19th September, 
1914, from the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs to the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs. You will have noted that the records on 
file are very meager in respect to this action. 
The C.G.S. in his memorandum of 24th 
September addressed to the Associate Minister 
of National Defense, dealt with the risks to 
Canada in the event of the two battalions being 
dispatched to Hong Kong from our Home 
Defence forces. He concluded that, in view of 
the situation, it would not prejudice the defence 
of Canada to dispatch a force of two battalions 
to Hong Kong. On the some day in a record of a 
telephone conversation with Mr. Ralston, the 
C.G.S. specifically s t a t ed t h a t he had 
recommended that dispatch of the force. There 
is nothing in our records to indicate the 
consideration given to the matter before this 
recommendation was made. I think I can explain 
the Pacific, with its major component at Pearl 
Harbour. He knew that the British intended to 
strengthen their naval forces at Singapore. He 
knew that the Chinese were at war with Japan 
and that active assistance from the Chinese could 
be expected in the event of a Japanese attack on 
Hong Kong through the Kowloon Peninsula. As 
a result of this knowledge he undoubtedly felt 
that Hong Kong was capable of defending itself 
against Japan until relieved by the British and 
the United States' fleets, or by active assistance 
for the Chinese Army. 
The point I am trying to make here is that in 
General Crerar's mind there was no thought of 
futility or hopelessness in connection with the 
Hong Kong expedition. 
Events of the 7th December at Pearl Harbour 
and the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse 
a few says later, completely changed the strategic 
position not only in the China Sea but in the 
whole of the Far Eastern regions. Japan in a few 
hours attained a command of the Far Eastern 
water that it was, and will be for some time, 
physically impossible to challenge. The dispatch 
of further assistance to Hong Kong was no longer 
a feasible operation of war; much less would 
there be even a fleeting opportunity to repeat 
the miracle of Dunkerque. 
If at the time of the inception of the Hong 
Kong expedition General Crerar had felt that it 
was a hopeless venture, I know that he would 
not have recommended that dispatch of a 
Canadian force. He knew that the garrison at 
Hong Kong would be in for a bad time in the 
events of war with Japan. There was a military 
risk in dispatching the force but that risk, in 
the light of existing conditions, was not sufficient 
to warrant a recommendation from him that the 
British request should be refused. 
For my part I subscribed entirely to the 
action taken by General Crerar. Had I been in 
his position I would have taken similar action. 
I have attempted to tell you what I know went 
through General Crerar's mind when he was 
faced with this problem. If her were here today I 
do not believe he could add very much to what I 
have told you . I hope it will not be necessary for 
you to send for General Crerar. He is doing a 
job in the U.K. that requires his full thoughts 
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why there is no record of these considerations. 
In the first place I am satisfied that the C.G.S. 
felt, in the light of the nature of the request, that 
the decision was primarily a political one. I am 
sure he felt, as I did every member of the General 
Staff who saw the cable, that the Canadian 
Government had no other course but to approve 
the request of the British Government. British 
and Indian troops were already in Hong Kong. 
Australian, Indian and British troops were in 
Singapore, Canada was asked to reinforce the 
garrison at Hong Kong. There was a military risk 
in sending these reinforcements to Hong Kong, 
bu t we are at war and similar r isks are 
inescapable in was, and we accept risks of a 
similar nature every time a troopship leaves the 
shores of Canada. I cannot imagine anybody with 
red blood in his veins suggesting that we should 
have refused to accede to the British request just 
because there was some risk involved. Other 
parts of the Empire had accepted the risk of 
Hong Kong. How could Canada refuse to accept 
a similar risk and at the same time justify our 
contention that we are in this war up to the limit 
of our resources. 
What I have just said does not mean that the 
C.G.S did not give careful consideration to the 
military risks involved. I know General Crerar 
very well indeed, and have been associated with 
him since we were at Royal Military College 
together before the last war. He never makes a 
decision without very carefully weighing the pros 
and cons of the problem under consideration. 
He did not have detailed information in respect 
to the actual nature and condition of the then 
existing defences of Hong Kong. He had, however, 
studied the defence of Hong Kong at the Staff 
College, at the Imperial Defence College and 
during a two-year term of duty at the War Office 
in London, he know that Hong Kong was a 
defended advanced naval base. He knew that the 
defences had been modernized for all round 
defence, either form the sea or from the land. 
He know that the land defences on the Kowloon 
Peninsula known as the Gin Drinker's Line, had 
been under construction since the early '30's. 
he knew that the base was capable of defending 
itself for a long period and that adequate reserves 
of food supplies and equipment were maintained 
in Hong Kong for that purpose. He knew that we 
would not be at war with Japan without the 
United States at our side. He knew that the 
United States' battle fleet was concentrated in 
to discuss the matter further with the C.G.S. My 
reasons for not doing so were that I felt, in the 
light of all the circumstances, that his decision 
was a sound one. I felt that there would be time 
to give refresher courses to both of these units 
prior to their departure, on the voyage and after 
reaching their destination. It is important to note 
that this time we were not aware of the date of 
departure. 
This phase of the inquiry, like that of the 
inception of the expedition, suggests that 
desirability of hearing General Crerar's evidence. 
I trust the Commission will not consider it 
imperative that General Crerar should give his 
evidence in person. I am quite sure that General 
Crerar could add very little to what he has 
already said in his memorandum and to what 
Brigadier Macklin and other officers can tell you 
about this phase of the inquiry. As I have already 
stated I consider that the return of General 
Crerar to this country to answer questions in 
connection with this inquiry represents a course 
of action that would be most difficult and almost 
impossible to justify. 
4. The State of Training of the two 
battalions selected for the Hong 
Kong Expedition 
The Winnipeg Grenadiers had been mobilized for two years and the Royal Rifles for about 
15 months. During that period both of these 
units had carried out periods of garrison duty. 
The Winnipeg Grenadiers had served a tour of 
garrison duty in Jamaica and the Royal Rifles 
had carried out a similar tour of duty in 
Newfoundland. The length of time these units 
had been mobilized and the fact that they had 
gained experience in the same general type of 
work that they would be called upon to perform 
in Hong Kong must be considered in relation to 
their fitness to undertake their new duty. I admit, 
and all directly concerned will admit, that both 
of these units required a refresher course. In 
fact, our policy today is to carry out reliefs so 
that all units doing garrison duty are given 
refresher training after a period of garrison duty. 
It is very necessary that we should have a 
clear idea in our own minds as to what exactly 
we mean by the term a well-trained and efficient 
battalion. Training is an all embracing term and 
must not be restricted to the purely mechanical 
and physical side of basic and elementary 
and all his energies. He is commanding the 
Canadian Corps of over 100,000 men. He is now 
engaged in training the formations that comprise 
the Canadian Corps. He may have to fight with 
that Corps any time, in these circumstances I 
suggest that he must not be taken away form 
his present command. 
3. Selection of Units for the Hong 
Kong Expedition 
The files that the Commission have had access to give a fairly complete story of this phase 
of our preparations. The Director of Military 
Training divided the units available into three 
classes. The two units that were eventually 
selected were in the third class because of their 
need for refresher training after a long spell of 
garrison duty. The period of refresher training 
given to such units is usually from six weeks to 
two months. 
On the basis of this recommendation by the 
Director of Military Tra in ing (Colonel, 
subsequently Brigadier Lawson), the Director of 
Staff Duties (Colonel Macklin) prepared a 
memorandum which indicated the various 
alternative methods by which two battalions 
could be selected for the Hong Kong Force. He 
recommended these battalions be found form 
the 4th Division and that the matter be taken 
up with the G.O.C., 4th Division. The Director 
of Military Operations and Intelligence (Colonel 
Gibson) concurred and the question came before 
me. I wrote a minute to D.S.D in which I stated-
(a) Please put up alternative (a) to G.O.C, 4th 
Division and ask for his recommendations. 
(b) It should be impressed upon the G.O.C. that 
we need the best he has." 
The question was then referred to the G.O.C, 
4th Division, who made strong representations 
that the two battalions be not taken away for his 
Division. The C.G.S. then made the decision and 
selected the two battalions that were to be sent 
to Hong Kong. His reasons are indicated in his 
memorandum to the Minister dated 30th 
September, 1941, which you have before you. 
It would appear from the records that there 
was a definite conflict of opinion as between the 
C.G.S. and myself. I was not alarmed when I 
heard of the decision taken and made no attempt 
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training. The first is the morale training, the 
second is the mental training and the third is 
physical training. 
Morale training seeks to develop such 
characteristics as loyalty, confidence, esprit-de-
corps, determination, sense of duty and morale 
courage. These characteristics can be and are 
developed throughout the work of a unit, 
irrespective of the nature of that work. Both of 
these units had served as units for a considerable 
period of time. Both of these units had been 
reported to us as having carried out their work 
in an effective manner and as far as we know 
there had been no disciplinary trouble in either 
of these uni ts during the course of their 
somewhat boresome garrison duty. I consider, 
therefore, that we had every right to assume that 
the morale of these units was good and given 
good morale a unit in spite of other limitations 
can, if called upon to do so, accomplish almost 
any task that may confront it. 
Mental training comprises the development 
of constant mental alertness, initiative, judgement 
and a readiness to accept responsibility. These 
characteristics, like the morale characteristics, 
can be developed in the normal work of the unit, 
whatever its nature may be. The Winnipeg 
Grenadiers , unfortunately, did not have 
opportunity in Jamaica for certain types of 
tactical and technical training. Nevertheless, the 
garrison work they had to do, and which they 
were reported to have done very well, afforded 
ample opportunity for the development of the 
morale and mental class of training. The same 
applies to the Royal Rifles, although this unit 
did have a greater opportunity for tactical and 
technical training. 
The physical side of training is for the 
purpose of conditioning the body so that it can 
fulfill the great demands of spirit and mind. Both 
battalions are reported to have paid considerable 
attention to this aspect of training. 
The point I am trying to make here is that 
the real worth of a battalion cannot be judged 
solely on training reports in the tactical and 
technical spheres. One must dig much deeper, 
and provided the collective spirits and minds 
are healthy, then other limitations can be very 
quickly overcome. 
Colonel J.K. Lawson, photographed in Ottawa, 16 October 1941. At the 
time he was Director of Military Training of Canada, and was subsequently 
selected to command the Canadian Brigade headed for Hong Kong. 
I maintain that the spirits and minds of the 
two battalions selected were healthy. Both units 
were well-officered and commanded by 
experienced commanders. Given a few weeks to 
settle down absorb their reinforcements and 
refresh, then either of these units could be 
expected to give as good an account of themselves 
as any other units available in Canada. 
May I paint out that Colonel Lawson knew 
more about the condition of each of these units 
than any other officer in Canada. It will be 
remembered that he was Director of Military 
Training of Canada at the time of the inception 
of the Hong Kong expedition. I was acting C.G.S 
when the cable arrived for the U.K. requesting 
the Hong Kong force be increased by the addition 
of a Brigade Headquarters. I discussed the 
selection of Brigade Commander and Senior 
Administrative Officer with General Browne the 
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Adjutant-General. We agreed that Colonel 
Lawson, the Director of Military Training, should 
be offered the command of the Brigade and the 
Colonel Hennessey be offered the Senior 
Administrative appointment. I telephoned to 
Montreal where General Crerar and Colonel 
Ralston were held up in their departure for the 
United Kingdom. I obtained their approval to 
these two appointments. I then sent for Colonel 
Lawson and asked him if he would like to 
command of the Hong Kong Expedition. He 
accepted and stated there was nothing in the 
world he would like better. The point I wish to 
make here is that Colonel Lawson knew the 
condition of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the 
Royal Rifles better than any other officer in 
Canada. He made no representations to me 
whatever in the way of suggesting changes and 
was perfectly satisfies with all the arrangements 
made, including the selection of units, scales of 
equipment, etc. This, I consider, to be a fact of 
the utmost importance Lawson never was a yes 
man and everybody who knew him and worked 
with him will testify to this fact. If he had felt 
any qualms about the condition of the units he 
would have said so in no uncertain terms. 
The second point I would like to bring out 
here is that Lawson's actions were based on 
conditions existing at that time. He knew there 
would not be time for refresher training in 
Canada and was satisfied with the selection of 
the units. 
In the light of after events, the training of 
these units is in question. In this connection, I 
would point out that both units had a total of 
practically two months for the refresher training 
before going into action at Hong Kong; about two 
weeks was available in Canada; three weeks was 
available during transit and a further tree weeks 
was available before operations began in Hong 
Kong. Naturally, I would have preferred to have 
had more time, bit I am satisfied that when we 
are informed of the derails of the actual 
operations at Hong Kong, we shall find that both 
un i t s acquit ted themselves in a manner 
creditable to Canada and that alleged lack of 
training in certain particulars did not and could 
not have affected the ultimate issue. 
I think I can say without any possibility of 
authoritative contradiction, that the two units 
went to Hong Kong were better trained than most 
of the units that went overseas with the 1st and 
2nd Divisions. 
To sum up I agree entirely with the statement 
made by the C.G.S. in his memorandum to the 
Minister of 30th September, that "the battalions 
going to Hong Kong should be efficient well-
trained battalions". I agree also with the 
s ta tement made in para 10 of the above 
memorandum to the effect the "both of the units 
are units of proven efficiency", the latter 
statement, of course, refers to the past work of 
these two units. The main point at this stage 
A group of soldiers from the Royal Rifles of Canada, along with the regimental 
mascot, Blackie, relax prior to their departure for Hong Kong, 27 October 1941. 
refresher training in Hong Kong? I suggest, in 
the light of conditions at the time, that there was 
no alternative but to accept the course we did. 
4. The Training of Reinforcements 
You will be given the detailed picture of how the two units were built up in reinforcements, 
by officers for the Adjutant-General's Branch. 
The question I shall attempt to deal with is the 
extent to which the inclusion of about 150 
partially trained reinforcements might affect the 
efficiency of the two units. 
My understanding is that these 150 men had 
not fully completed their training but were very 
carefully picked from the volunteers for the 
units. This, I suggest, is a most important point 
when you remember that training is an all 
embracing term and when measured, as we are 
attempting to measure it, must embrace the 
characteristics of the individual in addition to 
his record of technical training accomplished. 
Other things being equal, it is obvious that a 
man who had completed his technical training 
is more useful than one who has not. On the 
other hand, and speaking with the experience 
of one who commanded various units in the last 
war for over three years, I would say without 
hesitation that I would prefer as a reinforcement 
a really good man who had not completed his 
full training, to an average or poor man who had 
completed his training. I make this statement 
on the strength of my knowledge of the power of 
absorption in a good unit. 
Both units were brought up to strength with 
fully t ra ined re in fo rcements . Fi rs t 
reinforcements consisting of about 6 officers and 
150 men per battalion accompanied the force. 
Of this number, approximately 150 of the first 
reinforcements for each unit had not been 
completely trained. On the other hand, according 
to my information, these men had been 
volunteers and had the advantage of a further 
six weeks intensive training in transit and at 
Hong Kong before operations began. It is 
probable that these first reinforcements were 
called upon to join their units shortly after 
operations began. I am satisfied, from my own 
experience, that such men could have bee 
absorbed in the battalions without adversely 
affecting the efficiency of the unit. 
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appears to be whether the two units in question 
lived up to the specifications outlined by the 
C.G.S., namely, were they "efficient, well-trained 
bat ta l ions" . Given two-months period of 
refresher training then I am satisfied that both 
battalions would live up to specifications as 
stated. Unfortunately, events did not permit of 
these battalions being given the full period of 
refresher training desired. On the other hand, it 
can be assumed that the two-months available 
was not wasted and that great strides must have 
been made in the individual training during the 
three weeks; voyage, and in unit and sub-unit 
training during the three weeks that were 
available in Hong Kong. The energy and training 
ability of Brigadier Lawson is good evidence that 
every advantage was taken in the time available. 
I feel, therefore, that when these units actually 
went into action they would have been "efficient, 
well-trained battalions". 
Before I leave this aspect of the preparation 
of the Hong Kong expedition, I would like to point 
out that the factor of availability of shipping is 
tied in with our training policy. We all would like 
to complete the t r a in ing of u n i t s and 
reinforcements before sending them overseas. 
We have never been able to enforce this policy 
rigidly. The shortage of shipping, particularly 
ships equipped to carry personnel, had been a 
problem since the beginning of the war and had 
become more of a problem as each month 
passes. The policy we have had to lay down is 
that tying in of our training programmes very 
closely with those of courses overseas. This 
enables us to make use of shipping space as it 
is made available to us, without any lack of 
continuity of training. The training of units and 
reinforcements overseas continues from the 
point reached in Canada prior to embarkation. 
Such a policy is open to criticism. On the other 
hand, it is the only practical policy to follow in 
the light of the shipping situation. In the case of 
the Hong Kong expedition, we were particularly 
requested to make use of the sailing on the 27th 
October. Failing that, another sailing would not 
be available for about two months. The value of 
sending our troops via this first sailing was 
emphasized in the cable received for the United 
Kingdom. Should we in Canada have 
disregarded to urgency to the British request and 
have done everything possible to get the 
expedition on the first sailing and completed the 
Victoria, it is difficult to see how the Canadians 
transport to arrive did not affect the fighting 
efficiency of the force and I am convinced that 
it had no effect on the ultimate issue of the battle. 
If we throw our minds back to conditions 
existing at the time, it sis difficult to find any 
reasonable argument to support holding up the 
sailing of the troopship in order that both the 
troops and the freighter carrying the transport 
could sail in one convoy. The troopship was a 
fast ship capable of making nearly 20 knots. The 
freighter was a very slow ship capable of making 
about 8 knots. At the time war with Japan was 
not thought to be imminent and we had no 
information at Headquarters in Ottawa to 
suggest that war with Japan was likely to break 
out before the arrival of the second ship. It is 
interesting to speculate as to what might have 
happened if both ships had sailed in the one 
convoy. There are tree possibilities. The convoy 
could not have got to Hong Kong according to 
my information, but might have got beyond 
Manila and have been picked up by the Japanese 
Navy between Manila and Hong Kong. Secondly, 
it might have got to Manila as did the second 
ship and be now fighting with MacArthur's 
forces. Finally, the convoy might have been re-
routed at sea to Singapore. None of these 
alternatives are very attractive. 
6. Conclusion 
May I again emphasize the necessity to view all aspects of this inquiry in the light of 
conditions prevailing at the time and not in the 
light of subsequent events. If the first course if 
followed, then I consider that there is little 
ground for criticism in respect to the inception 
and preparation and despatch of the Hong Kong 
force. In fact, I feel that in the short time 
available, an excellent job was done. 
Kenneth Stuart was born in 1891 in Trois 
Rivieres, Quebec. He graduated from The 
Royal Military College in 1911 and served 
overseas with the Royal Canadian Engineers 
between 1915 and 1918. He was the editor 
of Canadian Defence Quarterly in the 1930s 
and served as Vice Chief of the General Staff 
at the time of the decision to send troops to 
Hong Kong. He succeeded H.D.G. Crerar as 
Chief of the General Staff in December 1941. 
He died in Ottawa in November 1945. 
5. Transport 
The situation in respect to the transport is rather complicated. It will be explained to 
you by those officers who actually dealt with this 
aspect of the detailed preparations. There are 
two general questions that should be asked in 
connection with the preparations involved in the 
shipping of the mechanical transport that was 
to accompany the force. These questions are as 
under:-
a. Why was not some mechanical transport 
loaded on the troopship, and what effect would 
the lack of this transport have on the fighting 
efficiency of the force? 
b. Why were not arrangements made for the 
second ship tha t carried the mechanical 
transport to accompany the troopship, and what 
effect did the non-arrival of this second ship have 
on the fighting efficiency of the units? 
In respect to the first question, I can only say 
that so far as I know it has not been firmly 
established that any transport could have been 
placed on the troopship. On the other hand there 
is some evidence to show that approximately 18 
vehicles might have been loaded in certain space 
that was alleged to be empty. The vehicles that 
were ear-marked to accompany the troopship 
were 6 Bren Gun Carriers, 2 Water Tanks and 
the balance made up of passenger and loader-
carrying vehicles. 
I have a contour map here which shows that 
area in which our troops were fighting in Hong 
Kong. It is a very enclosed country and 
mountainous. That area within the Gin Drinker's 
Ling in the Kowloon Peninsula and the Island 
itself, is not suitable for the use of tractor or 
wheeled vehicles off the reads, other than in a 
few isolated areas. I so not believe, therefore, 
that the lack of these 6 carriers and of the other 
transport indicated, had any appreciable effect 
on the fighting efficiency of the units. 
In respect to the second question. We know 
that we were asked to send a two-years; reserve 
of mechanical transport with the force. We did 
so. My assumption is, therefore, that the British 
troops in Hong Kong had a similar reserve. When 
this factor is taken into consideration and also 
the fact that civilian transport was available to 
be used from the large centers of Kowloon and 
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